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GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGES IN
AIRPLANE CRASH CASES WHEN WEATHER
IS A FACTOR
JOSEPH D. JAMAIL*
The federal government has undertaken the task of providing
weather information to airplane pilots. In this article Mr. Joseph
D. Jamail examines the legal problems that arise when an airplane
crashes because of inadequate weather information. His analysis
includes discussion of waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal
Torts Claim Act and the exceptions to that waiver, duties of gov-
ernment employees, and preparation for trial of weather-related
cases.
D URING the past half century we have witnessed the meta-
morphosis of air travel from a pioneering effort to a mode
of transportation that is commonplace for millions of Americans.
Yet, despite the phenomenal advances that have been made in
tihe technology of the industry, airplane crashes, often unexplained,
continue to be a cause of concern. This perplexing problem is
occurring in increasing numbers each day across the nation. A
client may appear in the lawyer's office with the barest of facts,
i.e. that an immediate relative has perished in a plane crash. Mil-
lions of dollars may then depend upon early recognition of the
potential liabilities of airport facility operators for an aircraft acci-
dent. The lawyer must consider the number of entities that are
involved in the operation of an airport. He must also consider the
possibility that the employees of an airport facility may testify at
the Civil Aeronautic Board's accident investigation hearing, with-
out counsel and without the employer being aware of his potential
tort liability. Moreover, by the time the Civil Aeronautic Board
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney-at-Law, Houston, Texas. Mr. Ja-
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reports its findings of probable cause, the time for filing notice of
claim with governmental entity facility operators may have passed.
The stakes are high, the time is short, and an awareness of poten-
tial liabilities and defenses is essential.
Various agencies of the United States may be liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act' for airport accidents. At most airports
the Federal Aviation Agency operates a ground control facility
that exercises radio or visual signal control over all airplanes that
are taxiing, taking off, or landing. The FAA clearance delivery
facility transmits air route and altitude instructions to aviators
intending to depart on instrument flight plans, while the FAA
approach control and departure control facilities exercise radio
and radar control of aircraft approaching and departing on in-
strument flight plans and provide radar traffic advisory infor-
mation to other aircraft on request. The United States Weather
Bureau observes, analyzes, and transmits weather information for
the use of aviators, while supplementary aviation weather reporting
stations operated by local public entities also provide weather in-
formation used in aviation; all stations are thereby exposed to
potential tort liability. No reported decision has been found in
which an airport owner' has been held liable for damages by rea-
son of the location, plan, design, or construction of the airport.
There are, however, some decisions from which such liability might
be inferred, the most recent one being Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines,'
a 1967 case. The trend implies that there may be a legitimate cause
of action against airport operators in the foreseeable future. Special
defenses such as governmental immunity no longer apply to the
federal government because the Federal Aviation Agency must
approve the airport plan or design whenever federal financial aid
is used." This discussion will be limited to the liability of the
United States Government.
Control tower facilities and radio navigation aids at airports
are usually owned, maintained, and operated by the Federal Avia-
tion Agency, a tax supported agency of the government, rather
128 U.S.C. § 2674 et seq. (1970).
2It should be kept in mind that all of our new airports are in the main financed
by the federal government.
' 10 Av. Cas. 17,265 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
449 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1970).
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than by the airport owner or operator. Visual aids such as wind
indicators, signs, and airport lighting, which are not a part of the
instrument landing system, are maintained by airport management.
The decision whether to install such facilities at a particular air-
port is clearly within the discretionary function immunity of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, but the discretionary decision to install
such aids having been made, there is no immunity for negligence
in their maintenance or use.'
In the leading case Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust
Company,' the United States was held liable for damages arising
out of a collision between two airplanes on a landing approach to
Washington National Airport. The trial judge found that negligence
on the part of a government employed control tower operator in
clearing both airplanes to land on the same runway at approxi-
mately the same time was a proximate cause of the accident.
The Government contended on appeal that the discretionary
function immunity of the Tort Claims Acte precluded liability.
This argument was rejected; the court reasoned that although dis-
cretion was exercised in the decision to operate the tower, the tower
personnel had no discretion to operate it negligently. This case
illustrates the distinction between discretionary decisions made at
the "planning level" for which there is immunity and those made
at the "operational level" for which there is not.
The doctrine of governmental immunity was asserted as a de-
:ense in Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,' wherein the United
States was held liable for negligence on the part of an FAA ap-
proach control employee at Kennedy International Airport who
failed to inform the pilot of an approaching airplane that visibility
at the airport had dropped from one mile to three-quarters of a
mile, although the minimum visibility for landing was one-half
mile. The Government relied unsuccessfully on "execution of a
regulation" immunity which provides that the Federal Tort Claims
Act shall not apply to: "Any claims based upon an act or omission
of an employee of the Government exercising due care in the
I See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
6 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
128 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
8 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
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execution of a statute or regulation whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid."' The statute or regulation relied upon by the
Government was Section 265.2 of the Air Traffic Control Proce-
dures Manual of the FAA which provides:
At locations where official weather reports are obtained by the
controllers through routine procedures and the ceiling and/or visi-
bility is reported as being at or below the highest circling minima
established for the airport concerned, a report of current weather
conditions and subsequent changes as necessary shall be trans-
mitted as follows:
(b) By approach control facilities to all aircraft at the time of
the first radio contact or as soon as possible thereafter.
The "execution of a regulation" exception was held inapplicable
because the controller did not comply with the regulation having
failed to furnish information "as necessary." The purpose of the
execution of a regulation immunity is to prevent tests of legality of
regulations by tort actions. The Government's defense based on
the discretionary functions immunity was rejected on the ground
that no discretion was left to the controller whether to comply
with section 265.2. The controller's decision of what weather in-
formation was "necessary" within the meaning of his procedures
manual is an operational rather than a planning decision. It seems
that the most difficult immunity problem raised by the Govern-
ment when relying on the Federal Tort Claims Act is the provision
for immunity from any claim arising out of misrepresentation."0
The court in the Ingham" case rejected this misrepresentation
exception as being too broad, saying that it would exempt from
tort liability any operational malfunctions by the Government that
involved communications in any form. Despite the fact that the
discretionary function immunity is inapplicable to control tower
operators when negligence is the basis for the cause of action
and that negligence is based on a failure to warn of impending
mid-air collisions, recovery is sometimes denied as a matter of
law because primary responsibility for avoiding collisions under
visual flight rules conditions rests with the pilots."' When a pas-
'28 U.S.C. S 2680(a) (1970).
1028 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
1 373 F.2d at 239.
'°United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 828 (1968).
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senger is concerned, however, this would not be the case.
Collision with other objects" may be enough to hold the United
States liable under the Tort Claims Act with responsibility being
based in part on the Federal Aid for Public Airport Development
Act."' Collision with other surface objects would probably lie out-
side the scope of the United States Government's duty. If, how-
ever, an airport operator notifies the FAA of the presence of sur-
face objects such as utilities lines or other obstructions outside the
airport boundary but in the approach lanes of the airport, and no
action is taken by the Government to remove them, the Govern-
ment may be held liable for subsequent collisions.
Private and commercial aircraft are in constant radio commu-
nication with a variety of ground facilities manned by personnel
of the FAA. In a typical FAA communications center there may
be as many as nine separate channels or frequencies in simul-
taneous communication with aircraft in various stages of flight.
It is presently the uniform practice of the FAA to continuously
record all such radio communications.'5 Each tape is retained by
the FAA for a period of thirty days and, if there has been no
accident or other mishap, the tape is then erased and reused. In
the event an accident has occurred, one of the first things done
by the National Transportation Safety Board investigator" is to
sequester the tape recordings of all pertinent radio transmissions
for possible future use. The business records statutes in most states
allow their admission without question, provided they are properly
authenticated.
The problems of proof in the cases against the Government are
monumental. Generally, all of the investigation is made by a gov-
ernment agency, formerly the CAB, now the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board. Furthermore, taking the deposition of the
investigator is at best extremely difficult. The investigators will give
no opinions or conclusions; often their notes are lost and they can
3 For example, when birds are attracted to swamps adjacent to airports.
14Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. S 1101 et seq.
(1970).
. '1 This is done on special tape recorders each of which will run for approxi-
mately twelve hours and will simultaneously record all transmissions on as many
as nine different frequencies.
" NTSB now regulates and has all the functions and duties the Department
of Commerce had at a prior time.
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remember nothing specific about the case. It is a problem, how-
ever, that is not insurmountable for the regulations require that
they keep any tape recordings of a relevant conversation.
Briefly, no cases have been found in which the Government has
been sued under the Tort Claims Act for making certifications that
were later shown to be inaccurate. The misrepresentation section'"
of the Tort Claims Act probably precludes recovery unless it can
be shown first that the Government made an unreasonably inade-
quate inspection, and secondly, that the disaster would not have
occurred had there been a proper inspection. The Government
makes many different types of certification. 8 Each aircraft has an
airworthy certificate issued by the United States Government; there-
fore, one would presume that it is safe to fly. The Government's
position in matters such as this is that when it issued the airworthy
certificate the aircraft was airworthy, and whatever happened to
the aircraft occurred after the certificate was issued. Again the
matter of proof would be difficult. We may see an assault on the
issuance of airworthy certificates, generally in the nature of a
breach of warranty attack; and if the misrepresentation section of
the Tort Claims Act can be avoided, recovery might be had on
this ground.
Pilot certification is another, graver concern, for usually a crash
is accompanied by pilot error, and the Government logically takes
the position that when it certified him he had not committed the
error, and the certification under any circumstances cannot cause
liability to attach to it. It may occur, however, that if there were
acts of negligence or wrongdoing prior to the certification, the
Government might be held liable for negligently licensing the pilot
or certifying him to fly commercial aircraft, without which he
could not fly and later crash. Certainly an assault will be made on
this ground when the time comes, and the time will come when
the airline in question does not have enough insurance coverage
or money to compensate for loss of life and damages caused by
the crash.
Military aircraft stand in the same shoes as military trucks or
1728 U.S.C. S 2680(h) (1970).
"8 Certification of pilots and crew members is provided for in 14 C.F.R. §
60-61 (1973); certification procedures for aircraft are found in 14 C.F.R. § 21
(1973).
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jeeps. If, due to the negligence of the pilot or Government in
maintaining such aircraft, injury or damage occurs, then the Gov-
ernment will be held liable under the Tort Claims Act. There is,
however, a specific provision in the act prohibiting a military per-
son from suing the Government under the Tort Claims Act.1 There
is a growing tendency, however, for the military flier to sue the
manufacturer, if there is a defect in the aircraft. There is no deter-
rent to this.
The problem reduces itself to the following. Usually the parties
vigorously contest the responsibility of the government employees
under any circumstances. The United States contends that it serves
as little more than a traffic policeman operating with almost no
discretion, merely applying formal rules and regulations designed
to govern the movement of air traffic. It is the pilot and the crew,
the United States says, that determine whether and how the flight
will be made. The Plaintiff usually asserts that the contrary is true;
that the flight is governed by instructions and regulations from
takeoff to landing, and that the Government has the ultimate re-
sponsibility for safety at the time of takeoff, while the plane is in
flight, and at landing.
Neither of these positions is completely accurate. Our system
of air traffic regulation is more sophisticated and better designed
to protect the public and avoid human error than either categorical
view suggests. Whenever a plane is moving, whether on the ground
or in the air, the captain has the final and ultimate responsibility.
He is, however, in constant contact with the ground and guided
by the government control facilities. The pilot can refuse to take
off when cleared but cannot take off if not cleared. He can request
a different runway or a different routing and, once cleared, can
proceed accordingly. If he encounters weather difficulties in route
he can ask permission to go in a different direction or to a different
level and, again, when cleared, can proceed. When his various
clearance requests are consistent with air traffic regulations and
established safety procedures, the United States facilities give the
permission he seeks; when permission is not granted for safety or
traffic control reasons, the pilot continues to fly under conditions
set from the ground.
19 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1970). See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)
and United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968).
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In short, there should be a close working relationship contem-
plated between the government-operated tower, control centers,
and weather facilities on the one hand, and crew on the other. The
responsibility is mutual and coordinated at all times. Each party,
however, has superior knowledge than the other in some respects.
The crew knows the condition and capabilities of the aircraft, and
must deal with the unusual and unexpected in flight. In this age
of electronics the tower personnel have superior knowledge and
capability when questions of traffic control and weather are in-
volved. While crews have weather training and know that "the air
is an unforgiving element," those in the government service are in
instant contact with weather stations in the area, and have avail-
able more instruments, information, and weather knowledge. The
crew relies on accurate and sophisticated weather guidance from
the tower, the responsibility which the Government has undertaken
and must carry out fully and completely.
The Government's responsibility is to promote air safety. This
responsibility includes a duty to promulgate rules and regulations
to provide adequately for safety in air commerce."° A detailed series
of procedures and regulations have been established by the Gov-
ernment under this general delegation from Congress governing
the activities of weather stations and tower control personnel. In
Hartz v. United States,2' the court held that the tower's duty is
not restricted to the manuals and regulations.
We disapprove the view that the duty of an FAA controller is
circumscribed within the narrow limits of an operations manual
and nothing more. We approve the view expressed by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ingham v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.,2 as follows:
'It is now well established that when the government undertakes
to perform services, which in the absence of specific legislation
would not be required, it will, nevertheless, be liable if these activ-
ities are performed negligently.'
Although a much fuller and more detailed review of the numer-
ous regulations and procedures could be made, it would serve no
2049 U.S.C. § 1421 (1970).
21387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
22 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
2 10 Av. Cas. at 17,608. See also Indian Towing Company v. United States,
350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955).
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purpose here. It is apparent that in the area of weather reporting
and the related operations of control towers a complete respon-
sibility has been assumed by the Government under terms and
conditions that require the exercise of the highest skills to be
applied according to exacting and continuously high standards as
particular circumstances dictate.
Tragic accidents have resulted from pilot error. Tragic accidents
can also result from weather reporting errors by those on the
ground. In neither instance is the fault intentional, but in each
situation the responsibility should rest when a clear and significant
duty is not performed with reasonable care under the circumstances
and the resulting dereliction is the proximate and immediate cause
of a crash. Each airline accident must be carefully considered in
the light of its particular facts. There is no automatic rule which
can fix responsibility on the Government or a crew when a weather
accident occurs.

